Prof. Murillo Gutier
E-mail: murillo@gutier.adv.br
Abstract
This article examines, on two complementary yet analytically autonomous planes, the institutional problem of the partial restoration of provisions vetoed by the President of the Republic. Part I sustains, on the abstract and dogmatic plane, the constitutional and procedural legitimacy of fractioned consideration of the presidential veto, defending the technical accuracy of the term “restoration” in lieu of “override” and demonstrating, on the basis of Article 66 of the Constitution and Articles 104-A through 106-D of the Joint Standing Rules of the National Congress, that the practice is institutionally supported. Part II addresses the concrete dimension of the problem, warning against the monocratic deformation this institution may undergo when captured by the presidency of the Directing Board — a phenomenon recent scholarship designates as presidentocracy.
The bipartition responds to a precise analytical demand. Defending the abstract legitimacy of the partial restoration is an affirmation of the deference owed to the Legislature within the Rule of Law; warning against presidentocracy is to protect that very same deference from its internal distortion. The two registers complement one another: an institutionally mature reading demands, simultaneously, deference and vigilance.
The analysis takes the “PL da Dosimetria” (Sentencing Calibration Bill) case of 2026 as its central object, condensing the nature of the veto, the division of preventive constitutional controls, the limits of congressional action, and the function of “interna corporis” acts. The synthesis is eloquent: Congress may partially restore the veto; the Directing Board may not, monocratically, subtract provisions from plenary deliberation.
Keywords: Presidential Veto; Partial Restoration; Legislative Deference; Presidentocracy; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Directing Board; Joint Standing Rules; National Congress; Article 66; Sentencing Calibration Bill; Rule of Law.