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Wer hütet die Verfassung? Die Fragmentierung der Entscheidungsmacht im brasilianischen Obersten Bundesgericht (STF)

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag untersucht die Fragmentierung der Entscheidungsmacht im Obersten Bundesgericht Brasiliens (STF) und zeigt auf, dass sich die institutionelle Praxis des Gerichts vom Modell der kollegialen Beratung entfernt hat, das die Verfassung von 1988 vorsieht. Ausgehend von den Konzepten der Supremokratie, formuliert von Oscar Vilhena Vieira, und der Ministrokratie, entwickelt von Diego Werneck Arguelhes und Leandro Molhano Ribeiro, analysiert die Studie, wie die monokratische Entscheidung — ursprünglich außerordentlich und vorläufig — zu einem ordentlichen Instrument individualisierter Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit geworden ist. Der Beitrag untersucht paradigmatische Episoden der Konzentration individueller Macht bei den Richtern, behandelt die Vetospielertheorie und die drei Dimensionen richterlicher Gewalt (Entscheiden, Signalisieren und Agenda-Setting) und bewertet die demokratischen Folgen dieser Konfiguration, mit besonderem Augenmerk auf den internen Kontramajoritarismus, die jurisprudentielle Kontingenz und das Risiko der institutionellen Vereinnahmung. Der Artikel schlägt institutionelle Reformen vor, um die Spannung zwischen individueller und kollektiver Macht im Gericht neu auszubalancieren.

Schlüsselwörter: Supremokratie; Ministrokratie; Entscheidungsmacht; Normenkontrolle; monokratische Entscheidung; Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit; kollegiale Beratung; individuelle Macht; Oberstes Bundesgericht; STF.

Wer hütet die Verfassung? Die Fragmentierung der Entscheidungsmacht im brasilianischen Obersten Bundesgericht (STF) - Murillo Gutier (1 download )
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Who Guards the Constitution? The Fragmentation of Decision-Making Power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This article investigates the fragmentation of decision-making power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), demonstrating that the tribunal’s institutional practice has departed from the model of collegial deliberation envisioned by the 1988 Constitution. Drawing on the concepts of supremocracy, formulated by Oscar Vilhena Vieira, and ministrocracy, developed by Diego Werneck Arguelhes and Leandro Molhano Ribeiro, the study analyzes how monocratic decision-making — originally exceptional and precarious — has become an ordinary instrument of individualized constitutional adjudication. The article examines paradigmatic episodes of concentration of individual power among justices, addresses veto-player theory and the three dimensions of judicial power (to decide, to signal, and to set the agenda), and assesses the democratic consequences of this configuration, with emphasis on internal counter-majoritarianism, jurisprudential contingency, and the risk of institutional capture. The article proposes institutional reforms to rebalance the tension between individual and collective power in the court.

Keywords: supremocracy; ministrocracy; decision-making power; judicial review; monocratic decision; constitutional adjudication; collegial deliberation; individual power; Brazilian Supreme Federal Court; STF.

Who Guards the Constitution? The Fragmentation of Decision-Making Power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court - Murillo Gutier (1 download )
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Quem Guarda a Constituição? A fragmentação do poder decisório no Supremo Tribunal Federal

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Resumo

O artigo investiga a fragmentação do poder decisório no Supremo Tribunal Federal, demonstrando que a prática institucional do tribunal se distanciou do modelo de deliberação colegiada previsto pela Constituição de 1988. A partir dos conceitos de supremocracia, formulado por Oscar Vilhena Vieira, e de ministrocracia, desenvolvido por Diego Werneck Arguelhes e Leandro Molhano Ribeiro, o estudo analisa como o poder de decisão monocrática — originalmente excepcional e precário — converteu-se em instrumento ordinário de jurisdição constitucional individualizada. O texto examina episódios paradigmáticos de concentração de poder individual nos ministros, aborda a teoria dos atores de veto e as três dimensões do poder judicial (decidir, sinalizar e pautar), e avalia as consequências democráticas dessa configuração, com destaque para o contramajoritarismo interno, a contingência jurisprudencial e o risco de captura institucional. O artigo propõe reformas institucionais para reequilibrar a tensão entre o poder individual e o poder coletivo no tribunal.

Palavras-chave: supremocracia; ministrocracia; poder decisório; controle de constitucionalidade; decisão monocrática; jurisdição constitucional; deliberação colegiada; poder individual; Supremo Tribunal Federal; STF.

Quem Guarda a Constituição? A fragmentação do poder decisório no Supremo Tribunal Federal - Murillo Gutier (1 download )
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Wounded Impartiality – The Republican Limbo of the Brazilian Supreme Court and the Principled Fallacy of ADPF 919

A critical response to the article “A plea bargain agreement cannot prevail over the Constitution,” by Lenio Streck and André Karam Trindade

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This article critically examines the thesis that “plea bargain agreements cannot prevail over the Constitution,” advanced by Lenio Streck and André Karam Trindade in the context of ADPF 919/DF. While the proposition is, in the abstract, legally defensible, the analysis demonstrates that the doctrinal silence regarding the objective impartiality of Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) Justices involved in the Banco Master scandal constitutes a principled fallacy. By confronting the principle of nemo iudex in causa sua with the absence of effective mechanisms for controlling judicial recusal at the apex of the Brazilian judiciary, the article argues that ADPF 919 reveals a pattern of supreme anti-republicanism, in which the Constitution is invoked not to limit power but to immunize it. The study draws on comparative law (Germany, the United States, Spain, and Portugal), precedents from the ECtHR, the IACtHR, and the STF itself, as well as contributions from Ferrajoli, Alexy, Häberle, Bobbio, and Loewenstein.

Keywords: judicial impartiality; ADPF 919; plea bargaining; Banco Master; republicanism; nemo iudex in causa sua; judicial recusal; principled fallacy; separation of powers; constitutional law.

Wounded Impartiality - The Republican Limbo of the Brazilian Supreme Court and the Principled Fallacy of ADPF 919 - Murillo Gutier (1 download )
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Die verletzte Unparteilichkeit – Das republikanische Limbo des Obersten Bundesgerichts und der prinzipientheoretische Trugschluss der ADPF 919

Eine kritische Erwiderung auf den Artikel „Acordo de delação não pode valer mais que a Constituição” („Kronzeugenvereinbarungen dürfen nicht über der Verfassung stehen”) von Lenio Streck und André Karam Trindade

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag unterzieht die These, wonach „Kronzeugenvereinbarungen nicht über der Verfassung stehen dürfen”, einer kritischen Analyse. Die von Lenio Streck und André Karam Trindade im Zusammenhang mit der ADPF 919/DF vertretene Position ist zwar abstrakt juristisch vertretbar, doch das doktrinäre Schweigen über die objektive Unparteilichkeit der in den Banco-Master-Skandal verwickelten Richter des Obersten Bundesgerichts (STF) offenbart einen prinzipientheoretischen Trugschluss. Anhand des Grundsatzes nemo iudex in causa sua und der fehlenden wirksamen Kontrollmechanismen für die Befangenheit an der Spitze der brasilianischen Justiz wird aufgezeigt, dass die ADPF 919 ein Bild der antirepublikanischen Gerichtshoheit zeichnet, in dem die Verfassung nicht zur Begrenzung, sondern zur Immunisierung der Macht herangezogen wird. Die Untersuchung stützt sich auf Rechtsvergleichung (Deutschland, USA, Spanien, Portugal), Präzedenzfälle des EGMR, des IAGMR und des STF sowie auf Beiträge von Ferrajoli, Alexy, Häberle, Bobbio und Loewenstein.

Schlüsselwörter: richterliche Unparteilichkeit; ADPF 919; Kronzeugenregelung; Banco Master; Republikanismus; nemo iudex in causa sua; Befangenheit; prinzipientheoretischer Trugschluss; Gewaltenteilung; Verfassungsrecht.

Die verletzte Unparteilichkeit - Das republikanische Limbo des Obersten Bundesgerichts und der prinzipientheoretische Trugschluss der ADPF 919 - Murillo Gutier (2 downloads )
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A Imparcialidade Ferida – O Limbo Republicano do Supremo Tribunal Federal e a Falácia Principiológica da ADPF 919

Uma resposta crítica ao artigo “Acordo de delação não pode valer mais que a Constituição”, de Lenio Streck e André Karam Trindade

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Resumo

O artigo examina criticamente a tese de que “acordos de delação não podem valer mais que a Constituição”, sustentada por Lenio Streck e André Karam Trindade no contexto da ADPF 919/DF. Embora a proposição seja, em abstrato, juridicamente correta, a análise demonstra que o silêncio doutrinário sobre a imparcialidade objetiva dos ministros do STF envolvidos no caso Banco Master configura uma falácia principiológica. Ao confrontar o princípio nemo iudex in causa sua com a ausência de mecanismos eficazes de controle da suspeição na cúpula do Judiciário brasileiro, o texto sustenta que a ADPF 919 revela um quadro de antirrepublicanismo supremo, no qual a Constituição é invocada não para limitar o poder, mas para imunizá-lo. O estudo mobiliza o direito comparado (Alemanha, EUA, Espanha, Portugal), precedentes da CEDH, da Corte IDH e do próprio STF, além de contribuições de Ferrajoli, Alexy, Häberle, Bobbio e Loewenstein.

Palavras-chave: imparcialidade judicial; ADPF 919; colaboração premiada; Banco Master; republicanismo; nemo iudex in causa sua; suspeição; falácia principiológica; separação dos poderes; direito constitucional.

A Imparcialidade Ferida - O Limbo Republicano do STF e a Falácia Principiológica da ADPF 919 - Murillo Gutier (5 downloads )
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O Insulto que a Constituição e o STF Proibiram

Violência simbólica no discurso do poder

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Resumo

O artigo analisa a fala atribuída ao Ministro Gilmar Mendes em entrevista ao Metrópoles, em 23 de abril de 2026, na qual a homossexualidade foi utilizada como exemplo de situação ofensiva à imagem de um homem público. A partir do conceito de violência simbólica desenvolvido por Slavoj Žižek, o texto examina como a linguagem pode operar como instrumento de exclusão e inferiorização, mesmo sem agressão direta. O estudo confronta a declaração com precedentes do STF (ADO 26/DF e ADPF 787/DF), com o histórico do § 175 do Código Penal alemão, com o julgamento Obergefell v. Hodges da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos e com a Resolução CNJ n. 305/2019, evidenciando a contradição entre a proteção constitucional da dignidade humana e o uso retórico da diversidade sexual como categoria de humilhação pública.

Palavras-chave: violência simbólica; dignidade humana; diversidade sexual; LGBTfobia; homotransfobia; linguagem constitucional; discurso do poder; ética judicial; STF; direitos fundamentais.

O Insulto que a Constituição e o STF Proibiram - Murillo Gutier (2 downloads )
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Die Beleidigung, die die Verfassung und der STF untersagt haben

Symbolische Gewalt im Diskurs der Macht

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die verfassungsrechtlichen Implikationen einer Äußerung des Richters Gilmar Mendes, Dekan des Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), in der Homosexualität als Beispiel für eine angeblich beleidigende Darstellung eines öffentlichen Mannes verwendet wurde. Gestützt auf das Konzept der symbolischen Gewalt von Slavoj Žižek wird argumentiert, dass die Schwere der Äußerung nicht im isolierten Wort liegt, sondern in der argumentativen Struktur, die sexuelle Orientierung mit Beleidigung, Scham und öffentlicher Herabsetzung assoziiert. Indem Homosexualität in das rhetorische Feld der Ehrlosigkeit verschoben wird, wird ein durch die Verfassung geschütztes existenzielles Merkmal in den Bereich der Demütigung verlagert.

Die Studie hebt den Widerspruch zwischen der Äußerung und den eigenen Präjudizien des STF hervor. In der ADO 26/DF (2019) erkannte das Gericht Homotransphobie als schwere Verfassungsverletzung an und ordnete sie dem verfassungsrechtlichen Rassismusbegriff zu. In der ADPF 787/DF (2024), deren Berichterstatter Richter Gilmar Mendes selbst war, befasste sich das Gericht mit dem Schutz von Transpersonen im brasilianischen Gesundheitssystem und bekräftigte die Menschenwürde als bindende rechtliche Grundlage. Der Artikel untersucht ferner das US-amerikanische Präjudiz Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) und die historische Erfahrung des § 175 des deutschen Strafgesetzbuches (BVerfGE 6, 389), die zeigt, dass Verfassungsgerichte unter dem Anschein rechtlicher Normalität gesellschaftliche Vorurteile reproduzieren können.

Der Artikel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Kritik an der Äußerung keine bloße Sprachpolizei, sondern Verfassungskritik ist. In Gesellschaften, die von historischen Ausschlüssen geprägt sind, ist Sprache ein Kampffeld um Würde: Eine Identität als mögliche Beleidigung zu benennen, bedeutet, sie an den symbolischen Ort der Minderwertigkeit zu versetzen. Die Verfassung verlangt, dass die Würde nicht nur in Gerichtsentscheidungen, sondern auch in der öffentlichen Sprache der Amtsträger geachtet wird. In einem demokratischen Rechtsstaat ist Vielfalt ein Eckpfeiler der verfassungsmäßigen Ordnung und darf nicht in ein rhetorisches Instrument der Demütigung verwandelt werden.

Schlüsselwörter: symbolische Gewalt; Menschenwürde; sexuelle Vielfalt; Diskurs der Macht; ADO 26/DF; ADPF 787/DF; Obergefell v. Hodges; Verfassungssprache; LGBT-Feindlichkeit.

Die Beleidigung, die die Verfassung und der STF untersagt haben - Murillo Gutier (1 download )
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The Insult Prohibited by the Constitution and by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court

Symbolic Violence in the Discourse of Power

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This study examines the constitutional implications of a statement attributed to Justice Gilmar Mendes, dean of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), in which homosexuality was used as an example of a situation supposedly offensive to the image of a public figure. Drawing on Slavoj Žižek’s concept of symbolic violence, the article argues that the gravity of the statement lies not in the isolated word employed, but in the argumentative structure that associates sexual orientation with insult, shame, and public degradation. By placing homosexuality within the rhetorical field of dishonor, the statement displaces an existential characteristic protected by the Constitution into the domain of humiliation.

The study highlights the contradiction between the statement and the STF’s own precedents. In ADO 26/DF (2019), the Court recognized homotransphobia as a grave constitutional violation and included it within the legal concept of racism. In ADPF 787/DF (2024), reported by Justice Gilmar Mendes himself, the Court addressed the protection of transgender persons in the Brazilian Unified Health System, affirming human dignity as a binding legal foundation. The article also examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and the historical experience of § 175 of the German Criminal Code (BVerfGE 6, 389), demonstrating that constitutional courts may reproduce social prejudices under the appearance of legal language.

The article concludes that criticism of the statement is not mere linguistic policing but constitutional criticism. In societies marked by historical exclusions, language is a field of dispute over dignity: to name an identity as a possible insult is to relocate it in the symbolic place of inferiority. The Constitution requires dignity to be respected not only in judicial decisions, but also in the public language of authorities. In a Democratic State governed by the Rule of Law, diversity is a cornerstone of the constitutional order and cannot be converted into a rhetorical instrument of humiliation.

Keywords: symbolic violence; human dignity; sexual diversity; discourse of power; ADO 26/DF; ADPF 787/DF; Obergefell v. Hodges; constitutional language; LGBTphobia.

The Insult Prohibited by the Constitution and by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court - Murillo Gutier (10 downloads )
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Is the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court a Criminal Court?

Constitutional Critique of the Judgment in AP 1,060/DF: Opportunistic Activism, the Weakening of Judicial Precedent, and the Transformation of the Brazilian Supreme Court into a Criminal Tribunal

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This study offers a constitutional critique of the judgment in AP 1,060/DF by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF). The analysis focuses on the tension between this decision and the restrictive doctrine of special jurisdiction by reason of office (foro por prerrogativa de função) consolidated in AP 937 QO/RJ (2018) and ADI 2,553/MA (2019). While these earlier rulings recognized special jurisdiction as an exception to the natural judge principle, binding it to offenses committed during the mandate and in the exercise of official functions, the AP 1,060/DF decision pursued the opposite path: through the broad use of connection, the Court absorbed ordinary defendants on a massive scale, effectively transforming the STF into an ordinary Criminal Tribunal.

The study examines the inversion of the severance rule, the violation of the natural judge principle (Article 5, LIII and XXXVII of the Constitution), the deficit of dual jurisdiction (Article 8(2)(h) of the Pact of San José), and the political context of the judgment and its impact on judicial serenity. Furthermore, the decision is analyzed through Georges Abboud’s typology of activisms, demonstrating that it cumulatively exhibits at least five activist modalities: performative activism, activism against the limits of the text, populist-punitivist activism, purely consequentialist activism, and administrative activism.

Finally, the study identifies the phenomenon of opportunistic activism (ativismo de ocasião) as a recurring pattern in the STF’s recent jurisprudence: an interpretive stance that, under political pressure, loosens its own established precedents, thereby undermining the binding force of constitutional adjudication, the epistemic authority of the Court, and the constitutional jurisdictional architecture of Article 102 of the Federal Constitution. The study concludes that the decision constitutes a self-contradictory precedent that acts in the name of the Constitution against the Constitution itself.

Keywords: special jurisdiction by reason of office; opportunistic activism; natural judge principle; judicial precedent; constitutional jurisdiction; AP 1,060/DF; Brazilian Supreme Court (STF).

Is the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court a Criminal Court? - Murillo Gutier (18 downloads )