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The Procrustean Bed in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: Fractures of Judicial Activism and Fissures in Constitutional Democracy – Murillo Gutier

The Procrustean Bed in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court

Fractures of Judicial Activism and Fissures in Constitutional Democracy

Prof. Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This article examines judicial activism in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) through the metaphorical image of the Procrustean bed. Drawing on Georges Abboud’s classification, it employs mythological figures — Echo, the Oracle of Delphi, Procrustes, Prometheus, Pygmalion, the Bacchants, the Erinyes, Daedalus, Endymion, and Cronos — to illuminate the different modalities of activism that produce fractures in the constitutional order and fissures in the democratic structure.

The central thesis holds that judicial activism must be understood as a process of transition between fissure and fracture: the fissure emerges when the decision begins to drift from the Constitution, statutes, and due process, even under seemingly noble justifications; the fracture occurs when this practice solidifies into a decisional method, compromising the structure of constitutional democracy. Judicial self-restraint, therefore, is not institutional cowardice but rather the mast of Ulysses — the mechanism through which the Court binds itself to law so as not to succumb to seductions external to the Constitution.

The article concludes that the countermajoritarian role of the STF, though indispensable, presupposes rigorous fidelity to the Constitution, statutes, and the procedural framework. Without these bonds, constitutional adjudication ceases to protect the Constitution and begins to replace it with judicial power. The Court may hear the Sirens; it may not follow their music.

Keywords: Judicial Activism; Procrustean Bed; Constitutional Fractures; Constitutional Democracy; Judicial Self-Restraint; Supreme Federal Court (STF); Separation of Powers; Performative Activism; Democratic Fissures.

The Procrustean Bed in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court – Murillo Gutier (147 downloads )

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Judicial Activism and Juristocracy: Barroso’s Decision on Abortion as a Paradigm of Self-Grounded Power – Murillo Gutier

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This study examines the farewell vote of Justice Luís Roberto Barroso favoring the decriminalization of abortion up to the twelfth week, investigating three phenomena frequently noted in specialized literature: judicial activism, juristocracy, and ministrocracy. The first refers to the overcoming of positive normative frameworks through extralegal reasons — moral, political, or ethical views of the adjudicator — culminating in decisionism. The second, in institutional terms, describes the judicial capture of politically sensitive decisions previously reserved to democratic deliberation. The third highlights the intense monocratic activity at the Supremo Tribunal Federal, which empties out collegiality and weakens the deliberative virtues proper to a constitutional court.

From this framing, the analyzed vote is shown to exceed the typical countermajoritarian function of judicial review — guardian of constitutional supremacy — and to invade the sphere of political conformation reserved to the legislator, converting individual valuative preferences into normative parameters. The critical point does not reside in the substantive theme in dispute, but in the method of decision: when reasons not extracted from the constitutional text or the law come to govern the outcome, jurisdiction ceases to operate as a limit and begins to act as an autonomous source of normative production, with effects on individual liberties and on the very separation of powers.

The study articulates the concrete case to the theoretical categories mentioned and confronts a relevant element of the Supremo Tribunal Federal itself: the idea of the eloquent silence of the legislator, whereby the deliberate absence of normative regulation may express a valid political choice to await the maturation of the social debate. The purpose is to circumscribe the examination to verifiable institutional questions, making explicit the methodological criteria that guide the analysis — textuality and structure of the Constitution, coherence with consolidated jurisprudence, standard of deference to the Legislature, and observance of collegiality.

Keywords: Judicial Activism; Juristocracy; Ministrocracy; Separation of Powers; Decisionism; Self-Grounded Power; Eloquent Silence; Democratic Legitimacy; Supreme Federal Court (STF).

Judicial Activism and Juristocracy – Murillo Gutier (199 downloads )
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Judicial Activism and Juristocracy in the Brazilian Context: A critical analysis of the contemporary practice of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court

Judicial Activism and Juristocracy in the Brazilian Context

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This article examines the phenomenon of judicial activism and the consolidation of a juristocracy in the Brazilian legal system. The study analyzes how the Supreme Federal Court (STF) has progressively expanded its institutional boundaries, appropriating functions historically reserved for the Legislative Power and displacing the center of political discussions toward the judicial sphere. Drawing upon the theoretical framework of Ran Hirschl on juristocracy and Jeremy Waldron on the government of judges, the article distinguishes between judicialization — a natural consequence of the 1988 Constitution — and judicial activism as an interpretive posture that surpasses institutional limits. The work critically examines judicial decisionism, the phenomenon of ministrocracy and the violation of collegiality in constitutional control, relying on the contributions of Lenio Streck, Georges Abboud, and Miguel Godoy. The analysis is further enriched by Byung-Chul Han‘s philosophical critique of self-founded power, which provides a theoretical foundation for understanding activism as a degenerate form of authority that legitimates itself exclusively through itself. The article concludes that all activism compromises democracy and the autonomy of Law, advocating for institutional balance and the primacy of legislative deliberation within the framework of the separation of powers.

Keywords: Judicial Activism; Juristocracy; Separation of Powers; Democracy; Supreme Federal Court (STF); Ministrocracy; Self-Founded Power; Judicial Decisionism; Constitutional Jurisdiction.

Glossary of Procedural Instruments of the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF)

Abbreviation / ExpressionExplanation in English
STF – Supremo Tribunal FederalSupreme Federal Court of Brazil. Highest judicial instance in the Brazilian legal system, functioning as the Constitutional Court. Responsible for upholding the Federal Constitution of 1988, settling conflicts of competence between the branches of government, and exercising concentrated judicial review. Composed of eleven justices (Ministros), appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
STJ – Superior Tribunal de JustiçaSuperior Court of Justice. Highest instance for the interpretation and uniform application of ordinary federal law (below the constitutional level) throughout Brazil. Responsible for harmonizing the jurisprudence of state and federal courts in non-constitutional matters.
ADI – Ação Direta de InconstitucionalidadeDirect Action of Unconstitutionality. Instrument of concentrated judicial review filed before the STF to challenge the unconstitutionality of a federal law or normative act. The decision has general binding effect (erga omnes). Only the entities listed in Article 103 of the Federal Constitution have standing to bring this action.
ADO – Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por OmissãoDirect Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission. Instrument aimed at establishing an unconstitutional legislative omission. The STF may set a deadline for the competent body to remedy the omission. Paradigmatic case: ADO 26, concerning the criminalization of homophobia and transphobia.
ADPF – Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito FundamentalClaim of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Constitutional Precept. Subsidiary instrument filed before the STF when no other constitutional remedy is adequate. It may target acts of public authorities at all levels, including pre-constitutional norms — distinguishing it from the ADI.
MI – Mandado de InjunçãoWrit of Injunction. Instrument for the protection of fundamental rights whose exercise is impossible due to the absence of legislative regulation. Paradigmatic case: MI 4733, decided jointly with ADO 26, leading to the criminalization of homophobia.
RE – Recurso ExtraordinárioExtraordinary Appeal. Remedy filed before the STF to challenge decisions of lower courts that violate the Federal Constitution. Instrument of diffuse judicial review. Since Constitutional Amendment No. 45/2004, admissibility requires demonstration of “general repercussion” (repercussão geral).
Repercussão GeralGeneral Repercussion. Admissibility requirement for the Extraordinary Appeal (RE) before the STF, introduced by Constitutional Amendment No. 45/2004. The legal question must have significance beyond the individual case. Once recognized, the STF’s decision binds all lower courts in similar cases.
AP – Ação PenalCriminal Action. Before the STF, filed within the Court’s original jurisdiction for persons who enjoy privileged jurisdiction by office (foro por prerrogativa de função). Exemplary cases: AP 1021, 1022, and 1023, cited in connection with the “Ministocracy”.
Controle ConcentradoConcentrated Judicial Review. Constitutional review conducted exclusively by the STF (federal level) or State Courts (state level). Decisions have general and binding effect (erga omnes and efeito vinculante). Instruments include ADI, ADO, ADC, and ADPF.
Controle DifusoDiffuse Judicial Review. Constitutional review exercised by any judge or court in a specific legal dispute. The decision generally produces effects only between the parties (inter partes). It reaches the STF through the Extraordinary Appeal (RE).
Decisão MonocráticaMonocratic Decision. Decision rendered by a single justice of the STF without participation of the full bench. Subject of criticism when issued in constitutional matters without subsequent submission to the full bench — a phenomenon referred to as “Ministocracy”.
PlenárioFull Bench / Plenary Session. Assembly of all eleven justices of the STF. Responsible for deciding the most important constitutional questions. The “virtual plenary” (plenário virtual) allows electronic voting without oral debate — criticized by Godoy as a “silent plenary”.
Efeito VinculanteBinding Effect. Effect of STF decisions in concentrated judicial review, which bind all judicial bodies and public administration entities at all levels. One of the most important features of concentrated constitutional review in Brazil.
Silêncio EloquenteEloquent Silence. Interpretive figure coined by the STF in ADI 347-SP, treating deliberate silence of the constituent legislature as an implicit normative decision. The absence of an express provision is understood as a conscious exclusion that cannot be overcome through judicial construction.
Foro por Prerrogativa de FunçãoPrivileged Jurisdiction by Office. Jurisdictional rule whereby certain officeholders are tried before a higher court by virtue of their office. Federal representatives and senators are subject to the original criminal jurisdiction of the STF for offenses committed in the exercise of their mandate.
Glossary prepared on the basis of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, the jurisprudence of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, and the legal literature cited in the article.

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