Prof. Murillo Gutier
E-mail: murillo@gutier.adv.br
Abstract
This article examines a structural distortion in the functioning of the Brazilian Legislative Houses: the concentration of decision-making power in the presidency of the Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, to the detriment of parliamentary collegiality. Through the concept of presidentocracy — a neologism inspired by the ministrocracy criticized in the Supreme Federal Court (STF) — the study analyzes how the monocratic control of the parliamentary agenda, combined with a restrictive interpretation of the standing rules, has transformed the House presidency into a unipersonal veto power over deliberation, impeachment proceedings, confirmation hearings, and Parliamentary Inquiry Committees (CPIs). The article identifies three critical frontiers of institutional capture — impeachment admissibility, the scheduling of hearings for nominees, and the extension of CPIs — and demonstrates how the standing rules themselves are systematically violated by presidential practice. The analysis draws on the republican tradition from Cicero to Pettit, dialogues with STF case law (MS 24.831/DF; MS 26.441/DF; MS 32.033/DF; ADPF 378 MC; MS 33.558/DF; MS 34.530 MC/DF; ADI 6.524/DF), and proposes structural reforms — automation of agenda inclusions by qualified majority, peremptory deadlines for impeachment complaints, and strengthening of points of order — as well as a cultural turn toward republican values in the internal life of Parliament.
Keywords: Presidentocracy; Ministrocracy; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Federal Senate; Chamber of Deputies; Agenda-Setting Power; Parliamentary Collegiality; Brazilian Constitutionalism; Republic.
From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy - Murillo Gutier (PDF) (4 downloads )