Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br
Abstract
This article investigates the fragmentation of decision-making power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), demonstrating that the tribunal’s institutional practice has departed from the model of collegial deliberation envisioned by the 1988 Constitution. Drawing on the concepts of supremocracy, formulated by Oscar Vilhena Vieira, and ministrocracy, developed by Diego Werneck Arguelhes and Leandro Molhano Ribeiro, the study analyzes how monocratic decision-making — originally exceptional and precarious — has become an ordinary instrument of individualized constitutional adjudication. The article examines paradigmatic episodes of concentration of individual power among justices, addresses veto-player theory and the three dimensions of judicial power (to decide, to signal, and to set the agenda), and assesses the democratic consequences of this configuration, with emphasis on internal counter-majoritarianism, jurisprudential contingency, and the risk of institutional capture. The article proposes institutional reforms to rebalance the tension between individual and collective power in the court.
Keywords: supremocracy; ministrocracy; decision-making power; judicial review; monocratic decision; constitutional adjudication; collegial deliberation; individual power; Brazilian Supreme Federal Court; STF.
Who Guards the Constitution? The Fragmentation of Decision-Making Power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court - Murillo Gutier (1 download )