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The Presidential Veto:: Between Legislative Deference and the Monocratic Capture of the Directing Board of the National Congress – Murillo Gutier

The Presidential Veto Between Legislative Deference and the Monocratic Capture of the Directing Board of the National Congress

Prof. Murillo Gutier
E-mail: murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This article examines, on two complementary yet analytically autonomous planes, the institutional problem of the partial restoration of provisions vetoed by the President of the Republic. Part I sustains, on the abstract and dogmatic plane, the constitutional and procedural legitimacy of fractioned consideration of the presidential veto, defending the technical accuracy of the term “restoration” in lieu of “override” and demonstrating, on the basis of Article 66 of the Constitution and Articles 104-A through 106-D of the Joint Standing Rules of the National Congress, that the practice is institutionally supported. Part II addresses the concrete dimension of the problem, warning against the monocratic deformation this institution may undergo when captured by the presidency of the Directing Board — a phenomenon recent scholarship designates as presidentocracy.

The bipartition responds to a precise analytical demand. Defending the abstract legitimacy of the partial restoration is an affirmation of the deference owed to the Legislature within the Rule of Law; warning against presidentocracy is to protect that very same deference from its internal distortion. The two registers complement one another: an institutionally mature reading demands, simultaneously, deference and vigilance.

The analysis takes the “PL da Dosimetria” (Sentencing Calibration Bill) case of 2026 as its central object, condensing the nature of the veto, the division of preventive constitutional controls, the limits of congressional action, and the function of “interna corporis” acts. The synthesis is eloquent: Congress may partially restore the veto; the Directing Board may not, monocratically, subtract provisions from plenary deliberation.

Keywords: Presidential Veto; Partial Restoration; Legislative Deference; Presidentocracy; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Directing Board; Joint Standing Rules; National Congress; Article 66; Sentencing Calibration Bill; Rule of Law.

The Presidential Veto Between Legislative Deference and the Monocratic Capture of the Directing Board of the National Congress - Murillo Gutier (67 downloads )

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From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy: The Capture of the Parliamentary Agenda by the Monocratic Power of Legislative House Presidents – Murillo Gutier

From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy

The Capture of the Parliamentary Agenda by the Monocratic Power of Legislative House Presidents

Prof. Murillo Gutier

E-mail: murillo@gutier.adv.br

Abstract

This article examines a structural distortion in the functioning of the Brazilian Legislative Houses: the concentration of decision-making power in the presidency of the Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, to the detriment of parliamentary collegiality. Through the concept of presidentocracy — a neologism inspired by the ministrocracy criticized in the Supreme Federal Court (STF) — the study analyzes how the monocratic control of the parliamentary agenda, combined with a restrictive interpretation of the standing rules, has transformed the House presidency into a unipersonal veto power over deliberation, impeachment proceedings, confirmation hearings, and Parliamentary Inquiry Committees (CPIs). The article identifies three critical frontiers of institutional capture — impeachment admissibility, the scheduling of hearings for nominees, and the extension of CPIs — and demonstrates how the standing rules themselves are systematically violated by presidential practice. The analysis draws on the republican tradition from Cicero to Pettit, dialogues with STF case law (MS 24.831/DF; MS 26.441/DF; MS 32.033/DF; ADPF 378 MC; MS 33.558/DF; MS 34.530 MC/DF; ADI 6.524/DF), and proposes structural reforms — automation of agenda inclusions by qualified majority, peremptory deadlines for impeachment complaints, and strengthening of points of order — as well as a cultural turn toward republican values in the internal life of Parliament.

Keywords: Presidentocracy; Ministrocracy; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Federal Senate; Chamber of Deputies; Agenda-Setting Power; Parliamentary Collegiality; Brazilian Constitutionalism; Republic.

From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy - Murillo Gutier (PDF) (221 downloads )