From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy: The Capture of the Parliamentary Agenda by the Monocratic Power of Legislative House Presidents – Murillo Gutier

From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy

The Capture of the Parliamentary Agenda by the Monocratic Power of Legislative House Presidents

Prof. Murillo Gutier

E-mail: murillo@gutier.adv.br


Abstract

This article examines a structural distortion in the functioning of the Brazilian Legislative Houses: the concentration of decision-making power in the presidency of the Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, to the detriment of parliamentary collegiality. Through the concept of presidentocracy — a neologism inspired by the ministrocracy criticized in the Supreme Federal Court (STF) — the study analyzes how the monocratic control of the parliamentary agenda, combined with a restrictive interpretation of the standing rules, has transformed the House presidency into a unipersonal veto power over deliberation, impeachment proceedings, confirmation hearings, and Parliamentary Inquiry Committees (CPIs). The article identifies three critical frontiers of institutional capture — impeachment admissibility, the scheduling of hearings for nominees, and the extension of CPIs — and demonstrates how the standing rules themselves are systematically violated by presidential practice. The analysis draws on the republican tradition from Cicero to Pettit, dialogues with STF case law (MS 24.831/DF; MS 26.441/DF; MS 32.033/DF; ADPF 378 MC; MS 33.558/DF; MS 34.530 MC/DF; ADI 6.524/DF), and proposes structural reforms — automation of agenda inclusions by qualified majority, peremptory deadlines for impeachment complaints, and strengthening of points of order — as well as a cultural turn toward republican values in the internal life of Parliament.

Keywords: Presidentocracy; Ministrocracy; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Federal Senate; Chamber of Deputies; Agenda-Setting Power; Parliamentary Collegiality; Brazilian Constitutionalism; Republic.



From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy - Murillo Gutier (PDF) (218 downloads )

Judicial Activism and Juristocracy: Barroso’s Decision on Abortion as a Paradigm of Self-Grounded Power – Murillo Gutier

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br


Abstract

This study examines the farewell vote of Justice Luís Roberto Barroso favoring the decriminalization of abortion up to the twelfth week, investigating three phenomena frequently noted in specialized literature: judicial activism, juristocracy, and ministrocracy. The first refers to the overcoming of positive normative frameworks through extralegal reasons — moral, political, or ethical views of the adjudicator — culminating in decisionism. The second, in institutional terms, describes the judicial capture of politically sensitive decisions previously reserved to democratic deliberation. The third highlights the intense monocratic activity at the Supremo Tribunal Federal, which empties out collegiality and weakens the deliberative virtues proper to a constitutional court.

From this framing, the analyzed vote is shown to exceed the typical countermajoritarian function of judicial review — guardian of constitutional supremacy — and to invade the sphere of political conformation reserved to the legislator, converting individual valuative preferences into normative parameters. The critical point does not reside in the substantive theme in dispute, but in the method of decision: when reasons not extracted from the constitutional text or the law come to govern the outcome, jurisdiction ceases to operate as a limit and begins to act as an autonomous source of normative production, with effects on individual liberties and on the very separation of powers.

The study articulates the concrete case to the theoretical categories mentioned and confronts a relevant element of the Supremo Tribunal Federal itself: the idea of the eloquent silence of the legislator, whereby the deliberate absence of normative regulation may express a valid political choice to await the maturation of the social debate. The purpose is to circumscribe the examination to verifiable institutional questions, making explicit the methodological criteria that guide the analysis — textuality and structure of the Constitution, coherence with consolidated jurisprudence, standard of deference to the Legislature, and observance of collegiality.

Keywords: Judicial Activism; Juristocracy; Ministrocracy; Separation of Powers; Decisionism; Self-Grounded Power; Eloquent Silence; Democratic Legitimacy; Supreme Federal Court (STF).


Judicial Activism and Juristocracy – Murillo Gutier (564 downloads )

Who Guards the Constitution: The Fragmentation of Decision-Making Power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court

Murillo Gutier | murillo@gutier.adv.br


Abstract

This article investigates the fragmentation of decision-making power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), demonstrating that the tribunal’s institutional practice has departed from the model of collegial deliberation envisioned by the 1988 Constitution. Drawing on the concepts of supremocracy, formulated by Oscar Vilhena Vieira, and ministrocracy, developed by Diego Werneck Arguelhes and Leandro Molhano Ribeiro, the study analyzes how monocratic decision-making — originally exceptional and precarious — has become an ordinary instrument of individualized constitutional adjudication. The article examines paradigmatic episodes of concentration of individual power among justices, addresses veto-player theory and the three dimensions of judicial power (to decide, to signal, and to set the agenda), and assesses the democratic consequences of this configuration, with emphasis on internal counter-majoritarianism, jurisprudential contingency, and the risk of institutional capture. The article proposes institutional reforms to rebalance the tension between individual and collective power in the court.

Keywords: supremocracy; ministrocracy; decision-making power; judicial review; monocratic decision; constitutional adjudication; collegial deliberation; individual power; Brazilian Supreme Federal Court; STF.


Who Guards the Constitution? The Fragmentation of Decision-Making Power in the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court - Murillo Gutier (668 downloads )