{"id":1482,"date":"2026-05-08T20:11:52","date_gmt":"2026-05-08T23:11:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/?p=1482"},"modified":"2026-05-08T21:18:14","modified_gmt":"2026-05-09T00:18:14","slug":"from-ministrocracy-to-presidentocracy-the-capture-of-the-parliamentary-agenda-by-the-monocratic-power-of-legislative-house-presidents-murillo-gutier","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/?p=1482","title":{"rendered":"From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy: The Capture of the Parliamentary Agenda by the Monocratic Power of Legislative House Presidents \u2013 Murillo Gutier"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align:center;\"><strong>Prof. Murillo Gutier<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align:center;\">E-mail: <a href=\"mailto:murillo@gutier.adv.br\">murillo@gutier.adv.br<\/a><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p style=\"text-align:center;\"><strong>Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align:justify;\">This article examines a structural distortion in the functioning of the Brazilian Legislative Houses: the concentration of decision-making power in the presidency of the Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, to the detriment of parliamentary collegiality. Through the concept of <em>presidentocracy<\/em> \u2014 a neologism inspired by the <em>ministrocracy<\/em> criticized in the Supreme Federal Court (STF) \u2014 the study analyzes how the monocratic control of the parliamentary agenda, combined with a restrictive interpretation of the standing rules, has transformed the House presidency into a unipersonal veto power over deliberation, <em>impeachment<\/em> proceedings, confirmation <em>hearings<\/em>, and Parliamentary Inquiry Committees (CPIs). The article identifies three critical frontiers of institutional capture \u2014 <em>impeachment<\/em> admissibility, the scheduling of <em>hearings<\/em> for nominees, and the extension of CPIs \u2014 and demonstrates how the standing rules themselves are systematically violated by presidential practice. The analysis draws on the republican tradition from Cicero to Pettit, dialogues with STF case law (MS 24.831\/DF; MS 26.441\/DF; MS 32.033\/DF; ADPF 378 MC; MS 33.558\/DF; MS 34.530 MC\/DF; ADI 6.524\/DF), and proposes structural reforms \u2014 automation of agenda inclusions by qualified majority, peremptory deadlines for <em>impeachment<\/em> complaints, and strengthening of points of order \u2014 as well as a cultural turn toward republican values in the internal life of Parliament.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align:justify;\"><strong>Keywords:<\/strong> Presidentocracy; Ministrocracy; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Federal Senate; Chamber of Deputies; Agenda-Setting Power; Parliamentary Collegiality; Brazilian Constitutionalism; Republic.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n<a  data-e-Disable-Page-Transition=\"true\" class=\"download-link\" title=\"Vers\u00e3o murillo gutier\" href=\"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br?download=1481&amp;tmstv=1778325595\" rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"download-link-1481\" data-redirect=\"false\" >\n\tFrom Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy - Murillo Gutier (PDF)\t(2 downloads\t)\n<\/a>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Prof. Murillo Gutier E-mail: murillo@gutier.adv.br Abstract This article examines a structural distortion in the functioning of the Brazilian Legislative Houses: the concentration of decision-making power in the presidency of the Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, to the detriment of parliamentary collegiality. Through the concept of presidentocracy \u2014 a neologism inspired by the ministrocracy &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/?p=1482\" class=\"more-link\">Continue lendo<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;From Ministrocracy to Presidentocracy: The Capture of the Parliamentary Agenda by the Monocratic Power of Legislative House Presidents \u2013 Murillo Gutier&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1483,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"saved_in_kubio":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[71,4],"tags":[468,467,464,138,466,390,469,465,141],"class_list":["post-1482","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-direito-constitucional","category-direito-processual-civil","tag-brazilian-constitutionalism","tag-chamber-of-deputies","tag-checks-and-balances","tag-democracy","tag-federal-senate","tag-ministrocracy","tag-presidentocracy","tag-republic","tag-separation-of-powers"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1482","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1482"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1482\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1505,"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1482\/revisions\/1505"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/1483"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1482"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1482"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/murillogutier.com.br\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1482"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}